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Abstract 
 
 
In 1987, the international community adopted the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer – subsequently labelled as one of the most successful environmental 
treaties of our time. In 1992, Peter Haas emerged with a study on epistemic communities and 
their efforts to protect stratospheric ozone. According to Haas’ research, epistemic 
community members – consisting of United States government officials and atmospheric 
scientists from the international community – affected the U.S. national stance for rulings on 
ozone depleting CFC substances, eventually leading to the adoption of stringent regulations 
through the Montreal Protocol. 
     However, in this essay it is argued that Haas’ work offers only a limited explanation of the 
processes that led to the formation of the Montreal Protocol and its subsequent ratifications 
due to the fact that activities of non-governmental organizations have not been sufficiently 
well acknowledged. It is argued that NGOs played a vital role in the process by: (1) partaking 
in governmental lobbying, (2) raising public awareness of ozone depletion, (3) endorsing the 
usage of environmentally friendly alternatives to CFC substances, and (4) affecting the 
outcome of the Second Meeting of the Parties in London 1990, when the weak stipulations 
of the first rendition of the Montreal Protocol were considerably strengthened.   
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer has been cited as one of 
the most successful environmental treaties ever signed. In a report from 2007, the UNEP 
declared that the 191 parties involved with the protocol had reduced their consumption of 
ozone-depleting substances by 95 percent. Most of the Protocol's phase out goals were 
completed before the scheduled deadline (UNEP, 2007: 1).  
     In 1992, Peter Haas published a renowned paper on the formation of the Montreal Protocol 
titled “Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric 
Ozone”. The study gave the world an interesting glimpse into the inner workings of members 
of scientific communities in regards to their efforts to protect stratospheric ozone. In his 
essay, Haas examined the behaviour of the United States during the negotiations leading up 
to the Montreal Protocol. The U.S. interests were initially perceived as somewhat vague by 
the international community, standing in stark opposition to their support for strong 
regulations of ozone depleting chlorofluorocarbon substances (CFCs) later in the process 
(Haas, 1992: 189). This policy-change is contributed to the influence of epistemic 
communities. 
      On the contrary, it can be argued that Haas’ work offers only a limited explanation of the 
processes which led to the formation of the Montreal Protocol, due to the fact that activities 
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have not been sufficiently well acknowledged. 
It is argued that NGOs played a vital role in the process, and that they did so in four main 
ways, by: (1) partaking in governmental lobbying, (2) raising public awareness of ozone 
depletion, (3) endorsing the usage of environmentally friendly alternatives to CFC 
substances, and (4) affecting the outcome of the international ozone negotiation in London 
1990, when the weak stipulations of the first rendition of the Montreal Protocol were 
considerably strengthened.   
 
 
1.1 Motivating the need for an updated view on the Montreal 
Protocol 
 
The need for further research on NGO activities in relation to the issue of ozone depletion 
stems from three main reasons:  
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     First, since Haas’ study (published in 1992), a substantial body of research in the same 
area has emerged that clarifies various aspects of the processes that led up to the Protocol’s 
formation.  
     Second, it may be argued that at present, the need for efficient international agreements 
regarding environmental challenges is perhaps greater than ever. Following King et al. (1994: 
15), it is of great importance that any study made on these subjects is consequential for eco-
nomic, social or political life, and that it can be used for gaining an understanding of some-
thing that affects the lives of many people. 
     Third, the research field of social sciences is overall lacking a comprehensive account of 
NGO activities in relation to the issue of ozone depletion. An important criterion which is 
relevant to the choice of research question is that the work should contribute to the existing 
stock of social science theories and frameworks. That is, the study shall not duplicate what 
has already been done, and also that it shall build upon the collective knowledge of others 
(King et al, 1994: 15-16).  
 
  
1.2 Purpose and Research Question 
 
In his 1992 paper, Haas (1992: 218) cemented his view on the role of NGOs, stating, "in 
general, public sentiment and the activities of non-governmental organizations such as 
Friends of the Earth had little direct impact on the adoption of CFC controls". The purpose 
of this essay relates to the aforementioned quote by Haas, and that is to determine what impact 
NGOs had on CFC reductions. It is important to understand that it was not only forced 
regulations that contributed to a decrease in CFC usage, but changes also came about through 
voluntary industry phase out plans spurred by NGO activities.  Consequently, the following 
research question has been chosen: What impact did non-governmental organizations have 
on the implementation of CFC reductions? The definition of “CFC reductions” is specified 
in the method section (3.2.2). 
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2. Previous research 
 
 
 
This chapter accounts for some of the previous research that has been conducted on the 
Montreal Protocol and the role of NGOs in international decision making. Section 2.1 in-
cludes an overview of Haas’ epistemic community theory, followed by some of the criti-
cism that has been directed towards Haas’ work. Lastly, an account of NGOs and their in-
fluence in the field of international governance is provided (2.2).  
 
 
2.1 The Epistemic Community theory by Peter Haas 
 
 
Haas defines an epistemic community as “a knowledge-based network of specialists who 
shared beliefs in cause-and-effect relations, validity tests, and underlying principled values 
and pursued common policy goals” (Haas, 1992: 187). Essentially, an epistemic community 
is a group of scientists or highly knowledgeable individuals pursuing a specific goal, for 
example a policy that regulates the usage of ozone-depleting substances. The epistemic 
communities working for the protection of the ozone-layer consisted of officials from the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs (OES) as well as atmospheric scientists from the international community 
– all with the shared agenda of environmental conservation (Haas, 1992: 190). An epistemic 
community starts from an empirical finding on a phenomenon that evokes moral or ethical 
feelings due to its social, environmental or cultural implications. The finding creates a 
common agenda amongst the members, as they all share a strong normative commitment to 
the same cause. When the epistemic community is established, it can start to exert its 
influence (Haas & Adler, 1992: 2). 
      An important political resource at the members' disposal is their ability to translate 
scientific findings into concrete policy advice. In the time leading up to the ratification of the 
Montreal Protocol, scientists from the epistemic communities briefed politicians on the 
development of scientific evidence on ozone-depletion, thus affecting them in their decision-
making process (Haas, 1992: 196).  
      After the epistemic community is established, a process of framing the issue, defining 
state interests and setting standards begins. The policy measures that governments might 
implement are deemed as largely dependent on how they perceive the severity of the issue in 
question. By collecting and interpreting scientific data, the epistemic communities guide 
decision makers in the choice of which institutions to consult to counter the issue at hand. 
The communities’ ability to frame an issue was particularly evident in regards to CFC-usage 
in the 1970s. Before 1972, CFCs were not widely considered harmful. Owing to efforts from 
the ecologic epistemic community, governments subsequently recognized CFCs as pollutants 
and began coordinating measures to counter the problem (Haas & Adler, 1992: 376). 
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     Furthermore, epistemic communities act as megaphones, distributing knowledge on a 
global scale. In the absence of international communication, knowledge is confined to a 
single organization, government or research group. The communities’ members aid in the 
process of information distribution by communicating with colleagues from other nations, 
either through direct meetings, conferences or other methods of exchanging knowledge (Haas 
& Adler, 1992: 378). 
 
 
2.1.1 Haas’ views on NGOs 
  
Haas has presented rather ambiguous views on NGOs throughout his research. For example, 
Haas acknowledges that the UNEP established the Coordinating Committee on the Ozone 
Layer (CCOL), which consisted partly of representatives of “nongovernmental organizations 
with active ozone layer research programs”. The committee met eight times between 1977 
and 1988, while subsequently reporting its findings in the Ozone Layer Bulletin. Therefore, 
it is noteworthy that Haas has diminished the role of NGOs, especially considering the fact 
that some of the organizations’ key figures were directly involved in the UNEP Committee 
(Haas, 1992: 201). Furthermore, Haas (1992: 218) claims that “they [NGOs] tended to merely 
reinforce government regulations that had already been introduced”. This statement, 
however, has little basis in reality. Instead, it is more likely that NGOs did not only help in 
framing the issue of ozone depletion, but also actively invoked policy change, aided in the 
process of developing alternatives to harmful CFC substances, and directed peoples’ 
sentiments in favour of regulations on ozone depleting substances.  
 
 
2.1.2 Criticism towards the Epistemic Community-theory  
 
Dunlop (2002: 1) has directed criticism at Haas for being ambiguous about the epistemic 
communities' interactions with other actors, stating that "the inability of Haas to provide a 
convincing conceptualisation of the connections between epistemic communities and wider 
groups stems from his initial construction of the concept and its empirical 
undernourishment". It can be argued that the theory on epistemic communities builds upon 
vague empirical evidence, which might explain why it has largely avoided refinement since 
it was first published. First, there lies a basic methodological complexity in even identifying 
the epistemic communities, let alone in operationalizing their perceived influence. Second, 
after successfully identifying an epistemic community, a researcher will encounter the 
practical obstacles of gaining access to and locating its members. This might explain why 
few scholars have attempted to critically examine the empirical grounds that Haas' theory 
rests upon (Dunlop, 2002: 8). 
      Haas is also evasive when discussing the actual amount of power that the epistemic 
communities can exert. As Liftin (1994: 12) points out, “Epistemic communities approaches 
downplay – almost to the point of neglect – the ways in which scientific information simply 
rationalises or reinforces existing political conflicts”. Thus, it is difficult to say to what degree 
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epistemic communities contributed to the cause of framing the ozone-depletion issue. 
Moreover, in highly political arenas where epistemic communities operate, like in the time 
leading up to the Montreal Protocol, it can be disadvantageous to be apolitical. The perceived 
influence of the epistemic communities originates from the bargaining power they hold with 
other actors, and the bargaining happens through a process of information distribution 
(Sebenius, 1992: 325). This claim is supported by a quote from Haas (1992: 188) himself, in 
which he also verifies the importance of information dispersal: “The community channelled 
discussions toward a strong ozone treaty by spreading information that suggested the need 
for stringent international CFC controls”. However, as pointed out by Dunlop (2002: 9), if 
epistemic community members are to spread information, they also have to interact with a 
myriad of other actors. Naturally, this leads Dunlop to the conclusion that the amount of 
influence epistemic community members’ can exert varies greatly as wider strategic games 
are played out. In such a scenario, the full implications that can come from consensual 
scientific knowledge emanating from epistemic communities may only be realised “through 
the involvement of other, more politically astute, groups”.  
     Furthermore, as stated by Haas (1992: 221), the epistemic community acted on the ozone 
issue by “disseminating information to government and corporate decision makers”. What 
Haas has neglected here is the broader form of information distribution; the one that is 
directed to the general public. As will be accounted for over the course of this essay, NGO 
efforts to inform the general public did emanate in concrete results, such as the 1989 CFC 
phase outs in Britain. It can therefore be argued that NGOs filled an important role in the 
collective effort to protect the ozone layer that the epistemic community could not, due to the 
fact they were more adept at dispersing information to a broad spectrum of people. Also, in 
relation to the critique issued by Dunlop, NGOs showed evidence of their political prowess 
by filing lawsuits that led to both CFC bans and faster phase outs in the United States.  
 
 
2.2 The extent of NGO influence 
 
“NGOs are no longer seen only as disseminators of information, but as shapers of policy and 
indispensable bridges between the general public and the intergovernmental processes”             
- Kofi Annan (1998), former UN Secretary-General  
 
NGOs can inarguably be seen as an emerging actor in the field of international governance, 
and in no area are they as established as in the field of environmental action (Jasanoff, 1997: 
579). On the subject of NGOs and decision making in environmental affairs, the World 
Commission on Environment and Development stated in a report from 1987 that 
“governments need to recognize and extend NGOs' right to know and have access to 
information on the environment”, and not only that, but NGO have long been recognized as 
crucial contributors to the task of environmental conservation by the UNEP (Jasanoff, 1997: 
580). 
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2.2.1 Constraints and opportunities associated with NGO influence 
 
Professor David Potter (1995: 33), a contributor to Environmental Policy in an International 
Context, has identified a number of constraints and opportunities associated with NGO 
influence in relation to environmental issues. In 1992, Mustafa Tolba, Executive Director of 
the UNEP, identified ten pressing matters of environmental concern in the world. Of the ten, 
Tolba concluded that the case of stratospheric ozone depletion was the one that had gone the 
furthest in regards to international agreements and conventions. Conversely, the issues of 
climate change, deforestation, desertification, water quality, land degradation and 
environmental disasters had hardly seen any advancement in terms of policy 
implementations. Potter argues that NGO influence increases when there are some policy 
measures already taken on the area for three different reasons. First, if there is an international 
treaty (such as the first instance of the Montreal Protocol, 1987) agreed upon on the matter, 
governments are committed to counter the issue. This provides a favourable environment for 
NGOs, as they can start lobbying activities and measure the amount of progress that involved 
parties are making. Second, party meetings provide arenas where NGOs can expand their 
policy networks and project their views. Finally, once an initial agreement has been reached, 
focus is to some extent shifted from agenda setting to policy implementation, the latter of 
which Potter believes NGOs have further leverage in. He cites the reason for this as due to 
the fact that governments tend to rely on NGOs for public support and for monitoring issues. 
Potter’s findings might therefore indicate that NGO influence increased after the first instance 
of the Montreal Protocol was agreed upon, thus affecting the ensuing revisions to a greater 
extent.  
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3. Method and Limitations 
 
 
 
3.1 Limitations  
 
The study is limited to only explaining the underlying causes for the success of the Montreal 
Protocol, and have largely discarded its actual implications globally. The reason for this is 
quite simple – the treaty is already widely regarded as being effective (see, for example, 
Mäder et al., 2010: 8), whereas there exists more controversy in determining what the 
contributing factors for its success were.  
     In addition, the essay is focused solely on the affecting factor of NGO-influence. As 
pointed out by Andersen and Sarma (2002: 353-360), two UNEP officials that accounted for 
the United Nations history in regards to the issue of ozone depletion, there were factors other 
than NGO activities that could have been of great importance for the successful outcome of 
the Protocol, such as trade measures, the establishment of the Multilateral Fund or industry 
cooperation. However, on the subject of limitations, Nørretrander issued the following 
statement: “A complete explanation of the world takes up as much space as the world itself” 
(Teorell & Svensson 2007: 98). This remark is very much applicable to the case of the 
Montreal Negotiations. With 186 participating countries, and thousands of people involved 
in the process, it would be virtually impossible to ponder every factor that could have affected 
the outcome. Therefore, alternative affecting factors have been discarded, and the essay 
remains concentrated on the role of NGOs. 
     Furthermore, the study has been limited to the initial 1987 rendition of the Montreal 
Protocol, its subsequent revision at the 1990 meeting in London, as well as the development 
of alternatives to CFCs. The decision to include the 1990 revision in London has been made 
since the initial Montreal Protocol was perceived as not stringent enough.  Andersen and 
Sarma (2002: 94), provides a speaking remark: “even before the ink was dry [on the Protocol] 
it was clear to delegates and scientists that the mild controls of the Protocol would not result 
in the protection of the ozone layer”. Therefore, it is interesting to determine if NGO 
influence affected not only the outcome of the first, weak instance of the Protocol, but if they 
also contributed to its subsequent strengthening. As indicated by Potter’s (1995: 33) findings 
on the matter, this might be the case due to the fact that NGO influence is increased once an 
initial agreement is in place, thus having a greater effect on any following revisions.  
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3.2 Method 
 
The method section commences with a description and definition of the term NGO, and a 
specification of which organizations that are included in this study (3.2.1). Moreover, the 
method used to measure the success of NGO activities in achieving CFC reductions is 
described (3.2.2). 
 
  
3.2.1 Defining environmental NGOs 
 
This essay focuses on a specific type of actor in civil society – the NGO. In a broad sense, 
the concept “civil society” encompasses all institutions, organizations and persons in pursuit 
of conveying or advancing a shared purpose through actions, ideas or demands on 
governments (Gemmill & Bamidele-Izu, 2002: 3). The term “NGO” can essentially be 
applied to a large array of different actors, ranging from small coalitions of activists to well-
funded, multinational organizations with significant technical and political capabilities 
(Jasanoff, 1997: 580). Charnovitz  (2006: 350) provides a definition of NGOs as “groups of 
persons or of societies, freely created by private initiative, that pursue an interest in matters 
that cross or transcend national borders and are not profit seeking”. Indeed, the term NGO 
encompasses a diversity of actors, with various functions, forms and areas of expertise, and 
as stated by Jasanoff (1997: 580), “the only structural feature they have in common is their 
formal independence from the state”. It is therefore essential to differentiate between the 
various existing non-governmental organizations, and to give a specification of what type of 
organizations I refer to when I use the term NGO.  
   On a general level, it is possible to distinguish between two types of NGOs – the self-
benefiting organizations, and the other-benefiting, respectively (see, Yaziji & Doh, 2009: 6). 
Self-benefiting NGOs are associations that are designated to primarily provide a benefit to 
their members. Some examples of self-benefiting NGOs are business and/or trade 
associations as well as labour unions. Other-benefiting NGOs, on the other hand, are 
organizations in which the contributors of labour and capital are not members of the intended 
beneficiary group, or if the benefits that come with the organizations’ activities are shared by 
a great number of people (such as in the world encompassing issue of ozone depletion).   
    Furthermore, it is possible to make a distinction between advocacy and service NGOs (see, 
Yaziji & Doh, 2009: 8-9). Yaziji and Doh (2009: 9) define the role of service NGOs as the 
ability to “provide goods and services to clients with unmet needs.” Service NGOs, such as 
the Red Cross or Doctors Without Borders, provide societal needs and undertake relief efforts 
in nations where the state is either unwilling or unable to provide such needs itself. Advocacy 
NGOs take a different approach, and instead work to shape the political, societal or economic 
system by promoting their interests trough active means. Their methods contain elements of 
lobbying, disseminating information, agenda setting, holding conferences, and/or organizing 
boycotts and promoting codes of conduct (Yaziji and Doh, 2009: 8, 11).  
    This essay is concentrated on other-benefiting, advocacy NGOs with environmental 
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agendas. On a more specific level, the activities of three NGOs with the aforementioned 
characteristics (and their respective country divisions) have been examined, namely Friends 
of the Earth (FOE), the Natural Resources Defence Council (NRDC) and Greenpeace. These 
specific organizations have been chosen owing to their high degree of involvement in regards 
to the ozone depletion issue.  
 
 
3.2.2 Measuring the success of NGO activities 
 
This is a qualitative desk top study based on an analysis of available historical material in the 
form of research papers. The methodology chosen for conducting a qualitative study is in 
accordance with King et al (1994: 4), meaning that it covers historical material (in the form 
of research that has previously been carried out), provides a comprehensive account of an 
event (e.g. NGOs and their connections to the issue of ozone-depletion), and contains an 
element of analysis.  
    To quantify and measure the extent of an arbitrary concept such as “NGO influence” is 
difficult and implies the need to carefully consider and define a methodical approach. 
Greenpeace has acknowledged this problem in a report on the organization’s involvement in 
the ozone issue, stating that it is seldom “possible to draw a direct cause-and-effect 
relationship between Greenpeace’s campaign activities and demands and governmental 
policy shifts. Such a relationship can only be drawn by inference.” (Maté, 2001: 11). The 
statement was prompted by the assumption that governments rarely wish to credit non-
governmental organizations with influencing governmental policies. Hence, the possible 
impacts related to NGO activities in achieving CFC reductions are addressed through 
studying four different aspects of the NGOs work: (1) Governmental lobbying, (2) the 
endorsement of environmentally friendly alternatives to CFCs, (3) raising public awareness 
of ozone depletion, and (4) involvement in international ozone negotiations. For each of the 
four aspects (detailed in the sections below), one or more criteria have been used to assess 
whether NGO activities have successfully had an impact on CFC reductions. “CFC 
reductions” is defined as a decreased prevalence of CFC substances in the world, as a result 
of legislative changes in various countries, industry phase outs and/or swaps to 
environmentally friendly alternatives and/or policy implementations in international 
negotiations. 
     
 
3.2.3 Governmental lobbying  
 
One important aspect of NGOs are their abilities to influence governments by criticising the 
“accepted frameworks of environmental knowledge” (Jasanoff, 1997: 581).  NGOs can do 
this by making sure that countries uphold their environmental obligations through partaking 
in litigations against governmental institutions. In the US, for example, it is possible for 
public actors to file lawsuits against violators of the environmental legislation. NGOs can 
also partake in governmental lobbying by disseminating scientific findings to governmental 
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officials by arranging conferences or meetings (Jasanoff, 1997: 586). 
    The success of NGO activities in governmental lobbying is considered by assessing 
whether there is evidence that their actions directed towards governments (or their 
institutions) have led to legislative changes with an observable impact on CFC reductions. 
 
 
3.2.4 The endorsement of environmentally friendly alternatives to CFCs 
 
NGO activities in relation to the ozone issue can also include involvement with industry in 
identifying and promoting the usage of environmentally friendly alternatives to CFCs. 
Successful NGO activities in relation to the promotion of environmentally safe alternatives 
can take on two main forms (see, for example, Gilfillan, 2002: 332-333).  First, NGOs can 
persuade the industry into switching to already existing friendly alternatives by persuading 
company officials. Second, NGOs can develop and/or promote their own alternatives to 
CFCs, which the industry then choses to implement in their manufacturing process.  
     The success of NGO activities in this regard is considered through assessing if industry in 
any country have switched to environmentally friendly alternatives owing to NGO 
persuasion, and/or the promotion of an NGO developed environmentally friendly alternative.  
 
 
3.2.5 Raising public awareness of ozone depletion 
 
One of the strong points of NGOs are their abilities to raise public awareness – they may for 
example, through their actions, turn people into active and knowledgeable consumers instead 
of them being passive bystanders (Wuori, 1997: 116).  Thus, by raising the awareness of the 
general public, NGOs can have an impact on CFC reductions. This can happen through 
organizing boycotts and/or informing the public about the dangers of goods that contain 
ozone depleting substances, which in turn can lead to industry phase outs due to diminished 
demand for products that harm the ozone layer (Cook, 1990: 336).  
     The success of NGO activities is considered through investigating whether a sector of 
industry choses to phase out products that contain ozone depleting substances owing to NGO 
activities which in turn led to changes in consumer behaviour (such as, for example, a boycott 
instigated by NGOs). 
 
 
3.2.6 NGO involvement in international ozone negotiations  
 
International ozone negotiations provides NGOs with a forum to pressure governments to 
strengthen global legislation on ozone depleting substances. After the 1987 rendition of the 
Montreal Protocol, parties were required to periodically assess the implemented control 
measures. Since the UNEP’s policy permits NGOs to attend and present their views during 
international negotiations, environmentalists are provided with an opportunity to advocate 
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their position to delegates (see Cook, 1990: 336-337). The success of NGO activities in this 
regard is considered through investigating whether NGOs have managed to successfully 
lobby for the inclusion of a specific policy proposals in a negotiated agreement. 
    A second way in which NGOs can impact negotiations is if they have managed to influence 
the negotiation position of one or more governments prior to the meetings (see, Rietig 2011: 
6-8). The success of NGO activities in this respect is considered through assessing if an 
attending governments’ stance on the ozone issue has changed as a result of, for example, a 
swing in the national public mood that is a direct result of NGO actions. In addition, for NGO 
activities to be considered a success in this regard, the government in question has to be 
deemed an important factor for the overall outcome of the negotiation.  
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4. Governmental lobbying 
 
 
 
 
 
The views presented by Haas’ stand in stark contrast to the views presented by Corinna 
Gilfillan (2002: 323), a former consultant involved with the UNEPs OzonAction Programme, 
who claims that "[NGOs have] identified and promoted policies and measures to implement 
the Protocol faster than mandated; advocated ozone and climate safe and environmentally 
sustainable technologies; forged alliances with industry and governments; served as 
watchdogs not only on illegal trade, but also on many other issues; and generally striven to 
ensure that the goals of the Montreal Protocol are achieved".  
      CFCs, or chlorofluorocarbons, refer to all fully halogenated compounds containing 
fluorine, chlorine and carbon – all with a variety of industrial uses such as in refrigeration, 
air conditioning, aerosol propellants or manufacturing of electronic parts. In 1974, two 
scientists from the University of California at Irvine, Mario J. Molina and F. Sherwood 
Rowland, presented a hypothesis that when CFCs enter the stratosphere, a chain reaction 
follows, in turn destroying thousands of ozone molecules. It was estimated that if industry 
continued to release CFCs at an unobstructed pace, atmospheric ozone would eventually drop 
by 7 to 13 percent (Andersen & Sarma, 2002: 9-10). NGOs involvement in the CFC issue 
started in 1974, after a coalition of environmental groups helped organize a press conference 
where Molina's and Rowland’s hypothesis was promoted (Gilfillan, 2002: 324). Following 
the conference and the popularization of the Molina–Rowland hypothesis, the United States 
introduced the first bans on CFCs with the Clean Air Act of 1977. Subsequently, other nations 
followed suit, with the notable exceptions of the Soviet Union and Japan, which both pointed 
towards the vague causal relationships associated with the scientific findings. In 1977, 
delegates from 39 countries attended a UNEP organized conference in the United States, 
which led to the first international treaty on the matter (Grundman, 2000: 2). Participants of 
the meeting agreed upon the World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer, and established the 
Coordination Committee on the Ozone Layer (CCOL), composed of experts from the 
agencies and NGOs that participated in the World Plan of Action. CCOL acted as a 
coordinator of international research, and continuously presented its findings to 
policymakers. The Committee met once a year from 1975 to 1985, and remained the only 
formal international institution with the ozone issue as its sole focus until January 1982 (Levy 
et al, 1993: 35-36). 
     The Natural Resources Defence Council (NRDC), a non-profit international 
environmental advocacy group, was early on an especially active actor involved in the ozone 
issue, and stood responsible for a number of legislative changes on CFC-usage after filing 
complaints against U.S. agencies. In a case from 1974, the NRDC petitioned the U.S 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
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and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to implement a ban on CFC aerosol 
products. As a result, the CPSC banned the manufacturing of CFCs for non-essential aerosol 
products by 1978, and prohibited interstate import and shipment of the same products by 
1979 (Gilfillan, 2002: 330). The efforts to ban aerosol products generated extensive media 
coverage in the United States, peaking in 1977 and 1978. The media coverage helped trigger 
a change in consumer behaviour, with reports of the time stating that demand for aerosol 
sprays with CFC propellants was diminished significantly. For example, the Gillette 
Company – a market leader in its segment – quickly lost market shares as the company’s 
deodorants included CFCs. The FDA Commissioner Donald Kennedy was later even quoted 
saying that ozone layer depletion could have adverse effects on the climate and increase the 
incidence of skin cancer (Smith & Canan, 2002: 297). 
     In 1983, the NRDC compelled the EPA to determine if action was necessary to protect the 
ozone layer. After court orders, the EPA was ordered to evaluate the consequences of 
continued emissions of ozone-depleting substances. Three years later, in 1988, the U.S. 
government agreed on the Ozone Protection Plan as a direct result of the NRDC's threat to 
sue the EPA for breach of the Clean Air Act.  
 
 
4.1 Conclusion on governmental lobbying 
 
NGOs had a measurable impact on CFC reductions through NRDC’s litigations against U.S. 
governmental agencies, starting with the ban on manufacturing and transportation of non-
essential aerosol products in the late 1970s. Furthermore, after the NRDC helped promote 
the Molina-Rowland hypothesis, the United States government implemented bans on CFCs 
in 1978 with the Clean Air Act. Finally, the NRDC subsequently used the Clean Air Act in 
1983 to sue the EPA, resulting in the adoption of the Ozone Protection Plan in 1988.  
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5. The endorsement of environmentally friendly 
alternatives to CFCs 
 
 
 
 
A key controversy related to the protection of the ozone layer, which was not covered by 
Haas in his essay on epistemic communities, concerns the chemical companies’ choice of 
substitutes to CFCs. It is possible to argue that a crucial factor behind the companies’ decision 
to accede to the growing pressure from scientists, environmentalists and the public to phase 
out CFCs was the availability of an economically viable, environmentally friendly alternative 
(see, Toke, 1998: 100-102).
 
 
5.1 Greenpeace’s development of an environmentally friendly 
alternative to HCFC and HFC substances 
 
 
As pointed out by David Toke (1998: 101), the chemical companies initially pursued a switch 
to hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). Greenpeace 
protested, voicing concerns that HCFCs and HFCs would also pose a threat to the ozone-
layer, as well as contribute to global warming. The policy problem regarding the companies’ 
inclination for a shift towards halocarbons such as HCFCs and HFCs proved hard to counter 
for the scientific communities. At the time there were several epistemic communities dealing 
with the issues of CFCs, thus producing a problem of coordination. Greenpeace also played 
a role in the controversies regarding hydrocarbons, which were seen as a possible 
replacement to CFCs instead of the HCFCs and HFCs advocated by the chemical companies. 
Hydrocarbons are not ozone-depleting, and have a small potential for increasing global 
warming. There was only one issue with hydrocarbons seen from the chemical companies' 
viewpoint – they were unpatentable and therefore economically disadvantageous. 
Historically, hydrocarbons had been abandoned in the 1930s for usage as coolants due to 
fears of their flammability. Greenpeace challenged the perceptions of the past, and funded a 
manufacturer in former East Germany to use hydrocarbons as coolants in refrigerators. After 
Greenpeace's endorsement, the usage of hydrocarbons spread amongst all the major German 
manufacturers and other continental refrigerator producers. Nowadays the notion of the 
flammability of hydrocarbons has largely been discredited, and development in the 
manufacturing process since the 1930s seems to have eradicated any perceived safety 
problems (Toke, 1998: 101-102).  
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5.1.1 A solution to harmful foam packaging  
 
Environmental groups were not only involved in the refrigeration industry, but also 
contributed to positive changes in the food packaging industry. In 1988, FOE-USA, the U.S. 
EPA, the Center for Global Change, NRDC, and the Environmental Defence Fund (EDF) 
gathered together in an attempt to develop a solution to the harmful usage of foam packaging. 
The packaging manufacturers put up weak resistance – perhaps sensing the pay offs 
associated with good will – and agreed to end their usage of CFCs by the end of the same 
year. A working group was formed for the purpose of developing an environmentally sound 
alternative, and NGOs subsequently publicly praised the industries’ determination to protect 
the ozone layer (Gilfillan, 2002: 342). 
       Some local governments, such as the Berkeley City Council in California, even explicitly 
outlawed CFCs in food packaging following the pressure from environmental groups. Three 
NGOs in the United States sought to translate the success into a nationwide industry phase 
out of CFCs. The U.S. agreement soon caught on in other countries, leading to similar 
voluntary phase-out plans in the Netherlands, the UK, and Canada. In the Netherlands, 
companies soon reported that they would stop using CFCs. In Canada, a major egg carton 
maker switched its production to an environmentally friendly alternative. In the U.K, all fast-
food restaurants and supermarkets ceased to use packaging made with CFCs (Cook, 1990: 
335).  
 
 
5.2 Conclusion on the endorsement of environmentally 
friendly alternative to CFCs 
 
Following Greenpeace’s development of an environmentally friendly alternative to HCFCs 
and HFCs, German and other European refrigerator producers ceased to use ozone 
depleting substances in their manufacturing process – thus resulting in an impact on CFC 
reductions. Furthermore, FOE-USA, the NRDC and others persuaded the U.S. industry to 
switch to environmentally friendly alternatives to CFCs in the food packaging industry. 
Following the U.S. success, the same agreement was reproduced in other countries such as 
the Netherlands, the UK, Canada and the Netherlands.  
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6. Raising public awareness of ozone depletion 
  
 
 
 
 
This chapter provides an account of NGO efforts to raise public awareness of ozone 
depletion. On a specific level, the activities of one specific NGO – Friends of the Earth – 
have been examined. Through organizing a public boycott of aerosol spray cans containing 
CFCs, FOE’s UK division forced the British industry to schedule a phase out of ozone 
depleting substances. 
 
 
6.1 FOE’s boycott in the United Kingdom, 1988 
 
In 1987, after the signing of the Montreal Protocol, Friends of the Earth International raised 
the ozone-layer issue to the top of their agenda, calling for a world encompassing ban on 
CFC aerosol products. Even though aerosol cans had already been banned in the United 
States, Scandinavia and Canada, they were still in major use in the UK, West Germany, 
Australia, France, The Netherlands, Hong Kong and other countries. To counter the problem, 
FOE called on the industry to phase out aerosols, and arranged widespread consumer 
boycotts. In the UK, aerosol products accounted for a majority of CFC emissions, with 62% 
of the substance going into spray cans. The annual amount of spray cans produced exceeded 
well over 700 million – with each consumer buying twelve cans every year on average. FOE-
UK had pressured the industry for years to change the formula of their products, but had thus 
far been unsuccessful. In 1987, however, the group ramped up their efforts, and launched into 
a full-scale campaign of consumer boycotts (Cook, 1990: 335).  
     In an attempt to raise consumer awareness, FOE issued a pamphlet called “The Aerosol 
Connection” which listed CFC-free products. On the release day of the fact sheet, several 
activists were seen demonstrating at the headquarters of Britain’s biggest CFC producer – 
the ICI – dressed up as spray cans. Nearing the new year of 1988, the industry stood unfazed 
by the antics. Even though FOE had distributed 40,000 copies of “The Aerosol Connection” 
and published advertisements in the national press, the manufactures remained passive. In 
response, the organization called on a public boycott of the twenty most well-known CFC-
based products on 20, February, 1988. Three days before the boycott was to commence, the 
industry announced a phase out of CFCs scheduled at the end of next year (Cook, 1990: 335). 
     Charles, Prince of Wales, who had been intensely active in the ozone issue, presented a 
supporting statement for the FOE boycotts, saying that the 50 percent reduction in CFC 
emissions had “actually been made possible by the thousands of ordinary consumers and 
environmentalists whose concerted pressure persuaded the aerosol manufacturers to phase 
out their use of ozone-depleting CFCs by the end of this year [1989]” (as quoted in Gillfillan, 
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2002: 340). The statement attracted significant media attention, and was featured in a front 
page story in the Daily Telegraph (Smith & Canan, 2002: 305). As pointed out by Gilfillan 
(2002: 340), the British media coverage of NGO activities “helped draw greater attention to 
the industry’s role in causing ozone depletion”.   
 
 
6.1.1 Conclusion on raising public awareness 
 
The activities of FOE-UK undoubtedly affected the national public mood in the United 
Kingdom, which in turn led to a British industry phase out of CFCs. Thus, NGO activities in 
relation to raising public awareness of ozone depletion may be deemed successful in 
achieving CFC reductions. 
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7. NGO involvement in relation to international 
ozone negotiations 
 
 
 
 
This chapter describes NGO activities in relation to three different international ozone 
negotiations: the 1987 Montreal Protocol, the 1989 London Conference, and the Second 
Meeting of the Parties in London 1990. It will be concluded that NGOs activities in all 
likelihood did not affect the 1987 rendition of the Montreal Protocol. In contrast, however, 
it will be argued that FOE’s United Kingdom boycotts may have influenced the outcome of 
the Second Meeting of the Parties in London 1990. Also, findings (presented in section 
7.3.1) implies that the NRDC successfully managed to lobby for the inclusion of maximum 
target reductions in the London agreement, thus having a tangible impact on CFC 
reductions.  
 
 
 
7.1 The Montreal Protocol of 1987 
 
In September 1987, delegates from 55 countries, the EEC, multiple industry organizations, 
six UN organizations and six NGOs finally met in Montreal. After intense negotiations, the 
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer was agreed upon on 16 
September. However, as pointed out by Andersen and Sarma (2002: 95), the Montreal 
Protocol was not stringent enough, and did little or nothing to protect the ozone layer. Soon 
after the signing of the Protocol, a report by the multinational group Ozone Trends Panel was 
released that presented indisputable evidence for the link between CFC emissions and 
depletion of the ozone layer. Simultaneously ozone depletion reached a historic high (Haas, 
1992: 213).  
     Even though some NGO attended the actual Montreal negotiations, there had been a 
noticeable lack of participation from environmental groups between 1985 and 1987. In 1985, 
the UNEP invigorated the diplomatic process with the signing of the Vienna Convention. 
Nevertheless, NGO involvement defaulted (Gilfillan, 2002: 324). As pointed out by Richard 
Benedick (1998: 88), the United States Chief Negotiator on the ozone issue, not a single 
environmental group attended the Vienna Convention, and only a few participated at the 
signing of the Montreal Protocol two years later.  
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7.1.1 Conclusion on the 1987 Montreal Protocol  
  
No research findings have been encountered that supports the notion that NGO activities 
influenced the 1987 rendition of the Montreal Protocol. The conspicuous lack of involvement 
from non-governmental actors in the years leading up to the Protocol might be ascribed to 
lack of funds or the inability to maintain governmental and public interest (Gilfillan, 2002: 
322).  
   However, when non-governmental organizations did not attend the signing one of the 
preluding meetings to the Montreal Protocol – Vienna Convention in 1985 – Peter Sand, head 
of the legal division in UNEP at the time, wrote an article about the agreement which stated 
that environmental NGOs would need to ramp up their involvement if effective international 
action was ever to come about (Sand, 1990). 
     
 
7.2 The 1989 London Conference 
 
"Finally, the alarm bells are ringing loud enough for the global public and heads of 
state and government to hear,"  
 
- Mostafa K. Tolba, at the closing speech of the 1989 conference in London (as quoted in 
Stammer, 1989). 
 
 
On 5-7 March 1989, the UNEP and UK government together organized the London 
Conference on Saving the Ozone Layer, which attracted representatives from more than 120 
countries. In the run up to the conference, the media had directed their attention to a wide 
array of topics related to the ozone layer, such as a scientific report on ozone levels over the 
Arctic and the changing U.S. position on CFC phase-outs. A particularly stressing point was 
to convince as many nations as possible that there was a real danger associated with ozone 
depletion (Smith & Canan, 2002: 303). The meeting saw a remarkable level of NGO 
involvement with more than 90 attending organizations, standing in sharp contrast to the 
handful that had participated in Montreal two years earlier (Benedick, 1998: 88). 
     The conference turned out to be a success, and was subsequently labelled as an important 
political milestone for protecting the ozone layer (Benedick, 1998: 123). The meetings paved 
the way for the ratifications that were to take place at the First Meeting of the Parties, 
scheduled two months later in Helsinki. Delegates expressed their concern over the ozone 
layer, and were in general supportive of the Montreal Protocol. The ultimate objective was 
set for a total elimination of halons and CFCs – a goal that had only 18 months earlier been 
seen as unacceptable by the United Kingdom and the EC commission. By the end of 1989, 
18 additional nations had ratified the Protocol owing to the negotiations of the London 
conference. Contrary to what had been the case for the 1987 Montreal Protocol, there now 
seemed to be a more widespread agreement on the validity of the science (Benedick, 1998: 
123). 
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7.2.1 Did NGO activities change United Kingdom’s negotiation stance prior to 
the London Meetings? 
 
In September 1987 one of the meetings that preluded the Montreal Protocol was held in 
Geneva. In the negotiations the United Kingdom was being blamed for blocking an 
agreement on CFC constraints following the country’s opposition towards the strong 
regulations proposed by USA and the Scandinavian countries – a behaviour instigated by the 
British industry (Andersen & Sarma, 2002: 80). Judging by this, the industry arguably had 
some influence over British foreign policy on the matter of ozone regulations. It is therefore 
noteworthy the United Kingdom helped organize the 1989 Conference in London, and also 
that the country became a proponent for strong regulations at the Second Meeting of the 
Parties in London 1990 (covered in section 7.3). 
     In fact, the United Kingdom, led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, was one of the last 
countries to support the Montreal Protocol. It is possible to argue that United Kingdom’s 
newly adopted concerns for the ozone layer can to an extent be ascribed to FOE-UK’s 
boycotts in 1988 (see chapter 6). As has been acknowledged by Haas (1992: 217), the British 
position on the ozone issue “had been essentially driven by the Department of Trade and 
Industry, which was oriented towards Britain’s sole CFC producer, Imperial Chemical 
Industries”. Consequentially, it can be argued that a major affecting factor for Britain’s 
altered stance on the ozone issue stems from the change in British industry attitudes, which 
were a direct result of FOE-UKs efforts. In a speech at the Ozone Layer Conference in the 
following year, Prime Minister Thatcher (1990, June 27) even acknowledged the fact that 
environmental organizations had successfully convinced the general public of the dangers of 
ozone depletion, stating, “you see the evidence for this in the far greater number of people 
who are using their purchasing power in the shops to buy ozone-friendly products. At the end 
of the day it is their habits, their choice of products, the care which they exercise which will 
be crucial.” However, Thatcher’s changed stance on the issue can similarly possibly be 
explained by her encounters with scientific evidence presented by British scientists (Haas, 
1992: 216). It is therefore not possible to contribute United Kingdom’s changed stance on 
the issue solely to the activities of FOE.  
      
 
7.3 The Second Meeting of the Parties, London, 1990 
 
In June 1990, 54 parties to the Montreal Protocol and 42 non-parties (amongst them large 
consumers such as Argentina, China, India, South Korea and Turkey) met again in London. 
The discussions were concentrated on several articles of the Protocol, including control 
measures, calculations on control measures, trade control, technology transfer and financial 
matters. The meeting was covered intensely by the media. A wide array of NGOs were 
represented through FOE, Greenpeace, Worldwatch and World Wide Fund for Nature 
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(WWF). The British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, insisted on everyone’s approval of 
the amendments and adjustments aimed at strengthening the Protocol. Britain was ready to 
contribute US$9 Million, and strongly supported an initial programme of action, in turn 
putting pressure on the USA to follow suit and agree on a fund to assist developing countries 
in their phase out of ozone-depleting substances. In the early negotiations, all developed 
countries agreed on contributing to the fund, with the United States being the exception. After 
countless midnight meetings in small groups, in which the U.K. played a crucial part, the 
second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol finally approved the adjustments and 
amendments (Andersen & Sarma, 2002: 123).  
 
 
7.3.1 The NRDC’s role in incorporating maximum target reductions at the 
London Meeting 
 
 
One striking difference in the 1990s London event, which contrasted with all earlier dealings 
on the ozone depletion issue, was the increased amount of attention directed towards NGOs. 
Richard Benedick (as quoted in Smith & Canan, 2002: 313), the United States chief 
negotiator on the Montreal Protocol, made a speaking remark on the extent of NGO 
involvement:   
 
‘For their part, environmental organizations were demonstrating more sophistication 
than had been the case during the process leading up to Montreal. Both before and 
during the London meeting, Friends of the Earth International, Greenpeace 
International, and the Natural Recourses Defence Council held press conferences and 
circulated brochures and briefing sheets to the public, the media, and officials to match 
the customary public relations output of industry’ 
     
Environmental groups were strongly represented throughout the entirety of the conference, 
and FOE, Greenpeace and the NRDC attracted particularly much media attention. In many 
instances, NGOs were cited as sources for news stories. In a New York Times story, David D. 
Doniger of the NRDC was quoted on the U.S decision to reverse on the proposal of the 
Multilateral fund, saying, “They [the Bush administration] have closed the hole in ozone 
policy that they opened themselves” (Shabecoff, 1990). During the negotiations, NGOs held 
press conferences and distributed informational leaflets to the public, press and officials. The 
NRDC went a step further, and created a proposition of target reductions for ozone-depleting 
substances that incorporated the maximum reduction proposed by any government (Jasanoff, 
588). By demonstrating that there was actual state support for each target in the proposal, the 
NRDC managed to circumvent the common argument that tighter environmental regulations 
would be impossible to implement. Thus, NGOs managed to directly influence the structure 
of the negotiation text (Benedick 1998a, 166).  
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7.4 Conclusion on the London Meetings of 1989 and 1990 
 
It stands clear that the 1989 and 1990 events in London represented a major breakthrough in 
terms of ozone protection. Noticeably, the meetings took place in the United Kingdom – a 
country which had for the last two years experienced a remarkably high degree of NGO 
involvement. NGOs inarguably influenced industry attitudes on the matter of CFC usage, as 
manufactures announced their phase out of CFC substances in direct response to FOE-UKs 
boycotts. As has earlier been accounted for, Britain was seen as an agreement blocker at the 
third session in Geneva at the instigation of the British industry. This fact speaks for the 
notion that the British industry also had some influence over the United Kingdom’s foreign 
policy. When FOE later managed to change industry attitudes, this specific obstacle was 
overcome, which might explain why Thatcher became a strong proponent for harder 
regulations at the subsequent London Meetings. As the United Kingdom represented a crucial 
factor for the outcome of the negotiations (see Andersen & Sarma, 2002: 123), it is possible 
that we would have experienced a less successful outcome of the Second Meeting if FOE had 
not been able to persuade the British industry to phase out CFCs in 1987. In accordance with 
Rieter’s findings (see section 3.2.6), NGOs can have an effect on international negotiations 
through influencing the negotiation stance of a key state.  
   Finally, as pointed out by Benedick, the NRDC managed to directly impact the London 
negotiation’s outcome through comparing policy alternatives that helped implement 
maximum target reductions on CFC substances.  
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8. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
All things considered, it stands clear that activities of non-governmental organizations did 
have an actual impact on the implementation of CFC reductions. Starting with NGO 
involvement in the popularization of the Molina-Rowland hypothesis, the first bans on CFCs 
ensued in the United States in 1977. While the first CFC bans might eventually have 
happened anyways, it is likely that NGO involvement helped speed up the process. Moreover, 
a direct cause and effect relationship could be drawn between the NRDC lawsuits and the 
U.S. CPSCs subsequent bans on CFCs for non-essential aerosol products in 1978, as well as 
the prohibition of interstate shipments and imports of the same products the year after. Also, 
following NRDC litigations against the U.S. EPA, the United States government adopted the 
Ozone Protection plan in 1988. Friends of the Earth similarly contributed to the cause of 
safeguarding the ozone layer, as they compelled the world’s largest CFC manufacturer, 
DuPont, to schedule a faster phase out of CFC-goods in 1992.  
     A notable achievement that can be ascribed to NGO activities is that of Greenpeace and 
the endorsement of environmentally friendly substitutes to CFC substances. As pointed out 
by Toke, chemical companies were first inclined towards a shift from CFCs to equally 
harmful HCFCs and HFCs. Following Greenpeace’s development of hydrocarbon coolants, 
a number of manufacturers switched their positions in favour of substances that did not pose 
any further threat to the ozone layer. In the resolutions that were adopted at the Second 
Meeting of the Parties, the usage of HCFCs and HFCs was only allowed if there were no 
alternatives available. By developing environmentally friendly substitutes, Greenpeace 
therefore aided in the process of implementing the Montreal Protocol. 
     The case where NGOs perhaps had the least amount of influence was in the 1987 rendition 
of the Montreal Protocol. Overall, there was weak participation from non-governmental 
organizations in the years prior to the Montreal negotiations. Not a single NGO attended the 
Vienna Convention in 1985, and only a few participated in Montreal two years later. This 
corresponds with Potter’s findings on the matter – NGO involvement is more likely to 
increase after an initial agreement is in place.  
     Consequentially, perhaps the most interesting cases of NGO involvement could be seen 
in the prelude to the conferences in London 1989 and 1990. A particularly strong example of 
NGO activities in direct relation to CFC reductions could be seen after FOE-UKs 
organization of the public boycott of CFC aerosol products in 1988. Interestingly, the British 
industry had previously exerted its influence over the U.K. government at the third Geneva 
meeting in 1987, leading to the country’s opposition towards strong CFC regulations. After 
FOE’s proposed boycott, the British industry reversed its position, and resorted to phasing 
out CFCs. Clearly, they would therefore no longer have any incentives to influence the U.K 
government to adopt lax regulations at any following meetings. The United Kingdom later 
emerged as a key actor at the 1990 Second Meeting of the Parties, where the country’s 
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representatives persuaded the United States’ officials into approving the adjustments and 
amendments. Thus, it is possible that NGO activities positively influenced the outcome of 
the London negotiations. However, as argued by Haas, Thatcher’s changed stance could 
similarly be explained by her confrontations with scientific evidence. A direct cause and 
effect relationship can therefore not be drawn between FOE-UK’s campaign and the United 
Kingdom’s behaviour in the actual negotiations.  Nevertheless, the notion that public opinion 
was an important factor for Thatcher’s support of strong ozone regulations is certainly 
plausible, especially considering the fact that public movements were explicitly mentioned 
as a crucial factor for safeguarding the ozone layer in the Prime Minister’s speech at the 
London Conference in 1990. Finally, in relation to the London negotiations, Benedick’s 
findings implies that the NRDC managed to affect the structure of the negotiation text 
through comparing policy alternatives. 
     On the subject of Haas’ research, it can be argued that the epistemic community theory 
approach could beneficially be complemented by accounts of the activities of NGOs. While 
epistemic community members undoubtedly played a role in the successful reduction of 
CFCs, Haas’ theory can to some extent be considered incomplete since it downplays NGO 
activities in relation to information distribution. By focusing solely on epistemic community 
members’ abilities to influence governmental officials and company representatives through 
the presentation of scientific evidence, Haas neglects the effects that come with a well-
informed public. By utilizing scientific information on the ozone issue, NGOs affected 
consumer behaviour, which in turn had direct implications for CFC producing companies. As 
has previously been pointed out by Dunlop, the full power of the scientific knowledge that 
stems from the epistemic communities might only be fully realised if accompanied by the 
involvement of more politically oriented actors. As such, further research may be warranted 
in order to derive a complementary approach to the epistemic community theory by taking 
into consideration the abilities of NGOs to disperse information. 
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